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“Citizenship Matters”: Lessons from the 
Irish Citizenship Referendum
J. M. Mancini and Graham Finlay
In 1916, armed insurrectionists revolted against the chief ally of the United States. The rebels surrendered quickly, but were punished severely: 15 were executed, and 3,500 faced imprisonment. Curiously, the British govern-
ment spared one of the rebel leaders, propelling him to take a central role in 
an ongoing and ultimately successful campaign to subvert British rule. Even 
more curiously, nearly fifty years later, in 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
welcomed this aging insurrectionist—who had abandoned his belief in the 
use of force against the British only a few years before—to the White House 
on a state visit. Johnson’s greeting to Eamon de Valera, by then the president 
of the Republic of Ireland, immediately suggests why he was spared: “This is 
the country of your birth, Mr. President . . . this will always be your home.”1 
Although de Valera, the American-born son of an Irish mother and a Spanish 
father, lived in the United States for fewer than three years, both the Brit-
ish courts and Johnson after them understood de Valera to be an American 
citizen—despite his expatriation, despite his participation in armed political 
struggle, and despite his ascent to the leadership of a foreign government.
Until recently, the notion that the country of one’s birth determines one’s 
citizenship had as powerful a hold in Ireland—where it was encoded in the 
1922 Constitution of the Irish Free State, the Irish Nationality and Citizen-
ship Acts of 1935 and 1956, and from 1998 to 2004 in Article 2 of the Irish 
Constitution—as it has in the United States, where it is protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.2 Nonetheless, in 2004, a referendum was called—and 
passed with a nearly 80 percent majority3—removing the constitutional provi-
sion of territorial birthright citizenship for the children of noncitizens.4 This 
monumental change in the citizenship regime of the newly prosperous Ireland 
of the “Celtic Tiger” marked a radical departure from the shared history, em-
bodied in de Valera’s personal story, that joined Ireland to the United States. 
At the same time, the citizenship referendum also highlighted both continued 
and new interconnections between the two nations. In the debates leading 
up to the referendum, both the American legal example and the historical 
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experience of legal and illegal Irish immigrants in the United States figured 
prominently. And both the revocation of jus soli and the circumstances leading 
to its revocation underscored the fact that Ireland’s sudden exposure to the 
complicated political pressures resulting from globalization, including new 
inward migration from Africa, Asia, and the accession states of the European 
Union, made its political landscape more like that of the United States than 
it had been.
In this article, we discuss both the importance of American practice for 
the normative discussions surrounding the removal of jus soli as an automatic 
qualification for citizenship in Ireland and the importance of the Irish debates 
as an example for the historical and normative investigation of the foundations 
of citizenship in the United States, especially in the field of American studies. 
In an increasingly interconnected world in which people, and not just goods 
and capital, are on the move, we argue that the elimination of jus soli as a basis 
for citizenship was unjustified in the Irish case, despite the popular pressures 
on Irish politicians, and that the pressure being placed on U.S. politicians 
to undermine jus soli should be consciously resisted. Changes in the basis of 
citizenship are not simply about the moral composition of the civic public, 
but have important economic and social consequences—chiefly, the creation 
of a docile class of laborers who can be dismissed and deported at will, and 
who have almost no rights to seek redress for the exploitive aspects of their 
condition. We believe that it is a lack of attention to these consequences 
that allowed the Irish government to succeed in removing unrestricted jus 
soli from the Irish Constitution, leading the debates to be solely carried on 
in terms of the intensity of immigrants’ connections to the Irish state and in 
terms of Ireland’s emigrant past. At a time when politicians from across the 
political spectrum in the United States propose the replacement of perma-
nent immigrants by guest workers, a similar neglect of the moral, cultural, 
and economic importance of jus soli threatens to impoverish contemporary 
debates surrounding immigration in the United States.
Migration and Citizenship in Comparative Perspective: Proscription 
without Exclusion 
One of the key contributions to the understanding of American migration 
in recent years has been Mae M. Ngai’s persuasive articulation of the direct 
relationship between restrictive naturalization laws and more direct forms 
of immigration restriction that developed in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century United States. As Ngai argues, “the system of quotas based 
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on national origin was the first major pillar of the Immigration Act of 1924. 
The second was the exclusion of persons ineligible to citizenship.”5 Both the 
persuasiveness of Ngai’s argument and the significance of historical campaigns 
for immigration restriction in the United States might tempt observers to 
conclude that there is a dependent relationship between immigration restric-
tion and citizenship proscription, and that the hidden purpose of the latter 
is always to bolster the former. 
But what if we move beyond this notorious period of immigration restric-
tion, and beyond the historical United States? The consideration of alternative 
contexts immediately shows that the relationship between immigration restric-
tion and citizenship proscription is not fixed, either in theory or in practice. In 
theory, it is possible for states to place onerous restrictions on immigration, yet 
to grant citizenship freely to the small numbers of migrants who are permitted 
to enter, or, inversely, to accept and even encourage immigration, but to curtail 
access severely to citizenship for immigrants and their children.
In practice, many European states embody this second scenario. Far from 
simply excluding foreigners, “Fortress Europe” has millions of non-European 
Union (EU) nationals living and working within its borders, many of whom are 
legally resident in Europe and many of whom were encouraged to immigrate 
by their host countries. In Ireland, the government deliberately promoted im-
migration on the basis of work permits during the early period of its economic 
boom, steadily increasing the number of work permits issued to non-European 
Economic Area (EEA) citizens from 5,750 in 1999 to 40,504 in 2002.6 These 
work-permit holders far outnumbered the uninvited migrants who were the 
target of the government’s campaign during the referendum, exceeding seekers 
of asylum by approximately 4 to 1 in 2002.7 And, in 2004, Ireland was one of 
only three states in the newly enlarged EU to allow the entry of unrestricted 
numbers of workers from the new accession states, leading to a sudden rise 
in immigration from eastern European and Baltic states,8 so that by March 
2006, “over 160,000” PPS numbers (the social security number needed to 
work in Ireland) had been issued to citizens of accession countries.9
While immigration has been encouraged in recent decades by Ireland and 
by certain other European states, this encouragement has not necessarily been 
matched by the liberalization of citizenship laws. Quite the contrary: in all 
of the three states that permitted unrestricted immigration from the acces-
sion states (Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), recent years have 
seen the tightening of access to citizenship. In Ireland, it was the very same 
government that expanded the recruitment of foreign workers that initiated 
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the citizenship referendum, and that also successfully argued in the Supreme 
Court in 2003 that it had constitutional sanction to deport the noncitizen 
parents of a citizen child.10
The Irish referendum is of particular consequence in Europe, because since 
the revocation of unrestricted jus soli in Ireland, there is no longer a single 
nation in Europe that grants unrestricted territorial birthright citizenship to 
people born within its borders. It should be admitted that Germany intro-
duced important reforms tending toward jus soli in 1999, notably a right to 
citizenship for second-generation immigrants at birth, provided one parent 
has been legally resident in Germany for eight years,11 and, as Christian Jop-
pke has emphasized, that the Netherlands, Belgium, and other countries have 
added restricted jus soli provisions to their previous jus sanguinis traditions.12 
Nonetheless, Germany’s reforms do not reflect a general European trend. 
Austria, which also has a large population of longtime alien residents, has 
not changed its citizenship law and has no jus soli component.13 And some 
European countries, notably Italy and Malta, have increased restrictions on 
access to citizenship through territorial naturalization or birth even as they 
have expanded access to citizenship via jus sanguinis.14 Moreover, there is a very 
important difference between unrestricted and restricted forms of territorial 
birthright citizenship such as “double jus soli,” which grants automatic citizen-
ship to the third generation, in that “double jus soli” substantially excludes the 
same people as a jus sanguinis rule would for at least two generations. 
Beyond Europe, the Irish referendum also marks part of a long trend of 
successful agitation against unrestricted birthright citizenship in countries 
governed by the common law tradition with which jus soli is traditionally 
associated. Australia removed unrestricted birthright citizenship in 198615 
and India in 1987.16 South Africa required that one parent be either a citizen 
or permanent resident in the South African Citizenship Act of 1995,17 and 
New Zealand removed unrestricted jus soli as of January 1, 2006, for much 
the same reasons cited in the case of the Irish Citizenship Referendum.18 
Similar pressures to remove unrestricted jus soli abound in the United 
States. Over the past ten years, every Congress has seen the introduction of 
amendments proposing citizenship proscription for the children of some 
immigrants.19 FAIR, the Federation for American Immigration Reform, 
appeals to the example of the Irish Citizenship Referendum and the work 
of Peter Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, discussed below, in its campaign to 
reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude the children of illegal 
aliens.20 Significantly, FAIR’s position deploys arguments made during the 
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Irish campaign, including the costs of births to “illegal alien mothers” and 
the threat of disease.21 Taking a different approach, Friends of Immigration 
Law Enforcement (FILE) argue that territorial birthright citizenship is a threat 
to national security, citing the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi. FILE, the Center 
for American Unity, and a number of members of the House of Representa-
tives filed an amicus curiae brief urging an understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that would deny birthright citizenship to children of individu-
als, like Hamdi’s parents, in the United States on work permits.22 This brief 
has been used by print and broadcast commentator Michelle Malkin to call 
for a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that would prevent the 
creation of “accidental Americans.”23 Access to citizenship has also been the 
target of proposed state legislation. Leo Berman, a Texas state representa-
tive, has put forward a bill that would deny state benefits to the children of 
undocumented immigrants as “illegal aliens,” in an explicit attempt to alter 
the current interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 Thus, while the 
United States has so far resisted campaigns to restrict territorial birthright 
citizenship, such campaigns are on the rise.
The Irish Citizenship Referendum: From Jus Soli to Jus Sanguinis
In Ireland, the successful campaign to overturn jus soli was brief and dramatic. 
Before the 2004 referendum, Article 2 of the Irish Constitution, enacted by 
referendum in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 with a 
vote of more than 94 percent, determined the citizenship of all children born 
in Ireland.25 Based on a straightforward provision of jus soli, Article 2 stated, 
in terms very similar to the Fourteenth Amendment:
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which 
includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish Nation. That is also the entitlement of 
all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland.26
The referendum proposed by the government in 2004, in contrast, trumped 
the authority of Article 2 via the insertion of an amendment to Article 9 that 
explicitly distinguishes between the children of citizens and the children of 
noncitizens. It reads: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a person born in the island of 
Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, who does not have, at the time of his or her birth, 
at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen is not entitled to 
Irish citizenship or nationality, unless otherwise provided for by law.
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While the passage of the referendum did nothing to alter Irish immigration 
law, then, it immediately and radically transformed the legal boundaries sur-
rounding citizenship.
The long-term implications of the referendum are difficult to gauge, but two 
significant changes may be noted. First, the amendment to Article 9 removed 
the provision of citizenship to the Irish-born children of noncitizens from 
its protected place within the Constitution to the more uncertain sphere of 
legislation. At its enactment, sitting elected officials obtained the power to de-
termine not only the terms under which immigrants could become naturalized 
citizens, but also the conditions under which the children of foreigners were 
eligible for birthright citizenship.27 During previous periods when birthright 
citizenship was determined by legislation rather than constitutional principle, 
the designation of citizenship as a legislative matter had no practical effect, 
as politicians never challenged jus soli. But the 2004 referendum was accom-
panied by the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act of 2004, which limited 
access to citizenship to those children whose parents had resided legally in the 
state for three of the four years previous to the birth.28 The government also 
specified that time spent on student visas or in the asylum process would not 
count as residence, even retroactively. Thus, the resulting act guaranteed that 
there would be a class of children, born in Ireland to legal residents, who had 
access to citizenship solely through the naturalization process. Moreover, the 
removal of citizenship to the legislative realm also presented the possibility 
that future governments might propose more onerous citizenship barriers, a 
scenario that has become increasingly likely with the introduction of legislation 
in 2006 (reintroduced in a modified form in 2008) that proposed a number 
of restrictions on immigrants with implications for citizenship—including 
the proposed requirement that non-EEA nationals seek ministerial approval 
to marry an Irish national.29 
Second, the amendment to Article 9 represented a fundamental philosophi-
cal shift in Irish law from the principle of citizenship based on birth within the 
territory to citizenship based on blood descent from the citizenry.30 Prior to 
the amendment, Irish law did employ jus sanguinis as a device for recognizing 
the citizenship of persons born beyond its borders: due to its emigrant his-
tory, Ireland (unlike the United States) grants citizenship to the foreign-born 
grandchildren of citizens, and under certain circumstances even to subsequent 
generations.31 However, until 2004 Irish law had never used parentage as a 
basis for the civic exclusion of persons born inside Ireland. The passage of the 
referendum marked a sharp break from both this tradition and the universal-
ism it entails. By imposing a barrier to citizenship that must be crossed only 
by persons who are not the descendants of citizens, as Oran Doyle argues, the 
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new Article 9 gave constitutional sanction to the granting of legal privilege on 
the basis of pedigree.32 By tying the future citizenry more firmly to the citizenry 
at the time of the referendum, moreover, the amendment also worked to limit 
temporal and ethnic change in the composition of “the Irish Nation.”
There are important parallels, then, between the Irish citizenship referen-
dum and historical efforts to restrict immigration and proscribe citizenship 
in the United States. Like the fixing of national immigration quotas in the 
1920s to the 1910 and 1890 censuses in the United States (and accompany-
ing bars to naturalization for excluded nationalities), the referendum can be 
seen to work toward “freezing” the nation in time by curtailing the access of 
“new” ethnic and racial groups. As Brook Thomas suggests, this impulse is 
more than merely xenophobic, but also represents a central limitation of clas-
sical republicanism: the tendency to define “the sovereign people . . . as those 
who founded the republic, a definition making it impossible to redefine ‘the 
people’ in light of changing circumstances.”33 In Ireland, where independence 
is much more recent than in the United States and lineal descent from the 
founders of the republic is still the source of great political and social capital, 
this “republican limitation” is felt even more acutely. Indeed, the politician 
most associated with the referendum, the then minister for Justice, Equality, 
and Law Reform Michael McDowell, emphasized that he was the grandson of 
Eoin MacNeill, who had founded the Irish Volunteers and served as Finance 
minister after independence.
In contrast to the 1920s United States, however, the Irish government 
campaign for citizenship restriction was made, as we have suggested, in the 
absence of overt border closures: the government never proposed reductions 
to overall immigration—or even remotely suggested limitations on immigra-
tion based on race or national origin. Nor did it propose more than minimal 
steps toward tightening Ireland’s borders, even though various commentators 
suggested that the enforcement of airline regulations barring the travel of 
heavily pregnant women or other small changes would cut entry numbers. 
Rather, the government insisted throughout the referendum campaign that 
it was not opposed to immigration, insisting that immigration had “en-
riched” Ireland’s economy and culture.34 And even within the government, 
the strongest impulse toward both policies—looser immigration and tighter 
citizenship—came from one party within the ruling coalition, the minority 
Progressive Democrats, whose two leading figures were McDowell and Mary 
Harney, then head of the department that issued the work permits that brought 
in the majority of Ireland’s foreign workforce, the Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment.
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The government’s official position was explicitly to distinguish between 
immigration and citizenship, and to insist that the referendum’s purpose was 
not to keep out immigrants, but to reform citizenship law. Its argument was 
that Article 2’s exclusive intended remit had been to provide constitutional 
entitlement to Irish citizenship for the children of those caught in quite another 
border dispute—the partition of Ireland—and that its passage had created 
an unintended constitutional “loophole” regarding citizenship. Although it 
is difficult to accept this argument at face value, the government’s expressed 
concerns about citizenship may not have been entirely disingenuous. A number 
of the arguments presented in favor of the referendum did derive in part from 
republican theories of citizenship, most prominently notions of duty and fear 
of corruption. Progressive Democrat TD (Teachta Dála) Fiona O’Malley, for 
example, drew upon Article 9 of the Constitution, which requires “[f ]idelity to 
the nation and loyalty to the State,” to bolster the argument that non-nationals 
needed to “prove” their connection to the nation by a term of residence before 
their children could “earn” the right to citizenship.35 Similarly, the Taoiseach 
(prime minister) argued that Article 2—and Ireland’s status at the time as 
Europe’s only nation fully to recognize unrestricted jus soli—encouraged 
fraud among non-EU nationals who might have Irish citizen babies not so 
that they could immigrate to Ireland, but so that they could obtain residence 
in other EU states.36 Particularly after the European Court of Justice offered 
a preliminary opinion establishing the right to residence in Great Britain of 
Man Levette Chen,37 a Chinese woman who traveled to Belfast specifically 
to have an Irish-born child, the government seized on this possibility as an 
affront to the duties of citizenship (and to Ireland’s EU neighbors).38
Nonetheless, it would be naive to think that immigration—and negative 
feelings toward immigrants within the electorate—did not play a role in the 
politics of the referendum. The government proposed the referendum at a 
time when polls showed significant gains for opposition parties, including Sinn 
Féin (who subsequently opposed the referendum). Although the government 
denied it, it was widely reported that it had received polling data showing that 
immigration was a lightning-rod issue for voter discontent.39 Furthermore, 
the government scheduled the referendum for the same day as European and 
local elections, leading opposition parties such as Labour to charge that the 
government was “facilitating anyone who wanted to play the race card.” Even 
some members of Fine Gael, which ultimately supported the referendum, 
criticized its timing on the same grounds.40 Nonetheless, Fine Gael’s Dublin 
candidate for the EU parliament, Gay Mitchell, openly admitted that hostility 
toward immigrants within the electorate had motivated his party’s decision not 
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to campaign against the referendum, but instead to give it passive support.41 
Noting a high degree of anger among voters, and that voters tended to blame 
all their misfortunes on immigrants, he somewhat paradoxically argued that 
the making of public arguments against the referendum was more likely to 
fan the flames of racism than the quiet passage of an amendment restricting 
immigrants’ rights to citizenship.42 
Whatever the effects of Mitchell’s passive strategy, the government clearly 
employed racist and xenophobic tropes to link the presence of immigrants to 
a pressing contemporary political issue: the crisis in the health-care system. In 
making its initial case for the need for a referendum, the government alleged 
that foreign women had overwhelmed the Dublin maternity hospitals, provok-
ing the hospitals’ masters (administrators) to demand the change. Although 
this charge was subsequently discredited,43 it served to divert attention from 
the government’s extremely unpopular pursuit of maternity and emergency 
closures within regional hospitals, which erupted into a political crisis in 
2002 when a premature baby died after her mother was refused admittance 
to Monaghan General Hospital.44 Furthermore, the government’s association 
of migrants with health risks facilitated the spread of a medicalized language 
of immigrant danger that Alan Kraut has described in the U.S. context as the 
“double helix of health and fear.”45 Indeed, this link was seized upon by the 
“Stormfront White Nationalist Community,” whose Web site recounted the 
“minutes of a meeting between Michael McDowell and two of the masters 
[in which] ‘Dr Geary said the high rate of infectious diseases among these 
groups has huge cost implications for the maternity hospitals [and that] it was 
surprising that there had not been a major catastrophe within the maternity 
services as yet.’”46 Seen in this context, claims by the Health minister Micheál 
Martin and the Progressive Democrats that citizenship proscription would 
prevent infant and maternal mortalities took on a clear political aspect.47
This, and the fact that Ireland has seen an increase in racist incidents,48 has 
led a number of scholars, most notably Ronit Lentin, to apply contemporary 
critical theories of race to the Irish situation.49 Lentin and others argue that 
the referendum was the culminating moment of a process of converting the 
Irish nation into a racial group. This is a powerful argument, and explains 
certain seeming anomalies, most obviously efforts by some officials to lobby 
for a special deal for Irish illegals in the United States—who, as members of 
Ireland’s diaspora are seen as having more of a connection to the Irish state 
than do actual immigrant residents—even while the government deports 
people illegally resident in Ireland. Nonetheless, while the government cer-
tainly employed developing Irish racism to promote a “yes” vote through 
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hostile appeals to “citizenship tourists” and “bogus asylum seekers” that clearly 
coded such people as ethnically and racially different—“people from Nigeria 
[and] Moldovia [sic],” as the Taoiseach put it—the purpose of this was not, 
as Lentin suggests, to separate the different and separate “undeserving” from 
“deserving” immigrants who contribute to the economy.50 Rather, we argue 
that it was precisely to mask the fact that the largest group of people affected 
by the citizenship referendum was not the asylum seekers from Africa that 
were the chief target of Irish racism, but the less visible and less politically 
contentious population of immigrant work permit holders of various races 
and ethnicities that vastly outnumbered them.51
Immigration as Insourcing: Differential Citizenship and the Dual 
Workforce
Cynical as the Irish government’s appeal to anti-immigrant sentiment may 
have been, it did not amount to a call for immigration restriction. What, 
then, might the government have hoped to gain from maintaining (and even 
lowering) legal barriers to entry while simultaneously raising legal obstacles 
to citizenship? To answer this question, it is first necessary to examine what 
kind of immigration was facilitated by the government’s policy on the eve of 
the referendum, not least because it contrasts in many respects with much 
American immigration. First, it was largely an immigration of temporary 
workers. Unlike in the United States, the vast majority of non-EEA immigrant 
workers admitted at the time were (and continue to be) work permit holders 
and students. The latter may work twenty hours per week (“full-time during 
the university holidays”) and themselves represent a significant workforce. 
Second, this sector of Irish immigration was (and is) dominated by contract 
labor: unlike American green cards, Irish work permits are issued to employers, 
rather than directly to immigrants, and do not permit workers to change jobs 
without first securing a new work permit. For non-EEA citizens, there was and 
is no legal framework for permanent economic immigration to Ireland, and 
no equivalent to the “visa lottery.”52 Prospective immigrants from outside the 
EEA thus faced three choices: get a temporary work permit and hope that it 
would be renewed, marry an Irish or EEA national, or claim asylum (and be 
banned from paid employment or third-level education until the resolution 
of a long and extremely uncertain legal process required to achieve refugee 
status).53 In effect, the status of the vast majority of Ireland’s non-EEA im-
migrant workforce was, and continues to be, more akin to that of migrant 
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agricultural laborers in the U.S. H-2 Guest Worker Program than to that of 
permanent resident aliens in the United States.54
The different legal framework surrounding immigration in Ireland thus 
requires a reassessment not only of the relationship between citizenship pro-
scription and immigration restriction, but also of the economic dimensions 
of that relationship. In the American context, citizenship proscription and 
immigration restriction have both primarily been conceived and analyzed in 
protectionist terms—as a means of preventing competition from immigrants 
by keeping them out and by limiting their access to economic resources and 
activities. Yet protectionism is only one potential economic goal of citizenship 
proscription. As an adjunct to increased migration, citizenship proscription 
has another possible motive: increased competition for jobs and wages. Ad-
ditionally, in combination with increased migration, citizenship proscription 
has the capacity not just to increase competition, but also to distort it by 
undermining the regulatory framework and institutions that are designed to 
ensure its fairness. The joint rise of the temporary work permit/student visa 
system in Ireland in conjunction with citizenship proscription has the potential, 
thus, to facilitate the emergence of two workforces: one composed of workers 
who enjoy the full economic benefits of citizenship, including social welfare 
benefits, and one of “insourced” immigrants who have only minimal recourse 
even to basic employment protections such as the right to change jobs.
This reading of the current circumstances is lent plausibility on several 
fronts. The first is that the rights of noncitizens are not equal to those of 
citizens. Although, as sociologist Yasemin Soysal argues, “international con-
ventions and charters . . . oblige nation-states not to make distinctions on 
the grounds of nationality in granting civil, social, and political rights,”55 
the Irish Constitution (like many other national constitutions) does restrict 
certain rights and protections to citizens.56 Both work permit holders and 
European workers from the new accession states are excluded from social 
welfare benefits, which has led to a marked incidence in homelessness and 
other forms of deprivation among eastern European migrants.57 In terms of 
politics, foreign nationals residing in Ireland can vote and run for office at the 
local level, but they cannot vote in national elections or referenda. Similarly, 
there is evidence that noncitizens are less likely to feel represented by or to 
join political parties, particularly mainstream parties58 and unions.59 This 
places noncitizens at an economic disadvantage in, for example, representa-
tion at pay negotiations and access to redress for discrimination or wrongful 
dismissal.60 Further, Ireland has not ratified the International Convention on 
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the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families and has blocked or opted out of European Union directives, such 
as the 2002 Temporary Agency Workers Directive, that would give migrant 
workers hired from other countries greater parity with Irish workers in terms 
of workplace rights.61
Second, the outcome suggested above accorded with the stated ideology 
of prominent members of the government, and with policy goals such as 
checking inflation (which gained Ireland the censure of the EU in the late 
1990s) and maintaining low levels of taxation. McDowell unapologetically 
embraced the economic benefits of an extreme form of competition and even 
inequality itself, arguing in an interview with the Irish Catholic that “a dynamic 
liberal economy like ours . . . demands flexibility and inequality in some 
respects to function.”62 Presumably wage inflation was one of the chief issues 
in McDowell’s mind, as protracted, expensive demands for pay increases had 
become a commonplace in Ireland by this time. Migrant labor addressed this 
issue: the recruitment of five thousand Filipino nurses, for example, averted a 
near-catastrophic labor shortage that threatened to cripple the health service 
and did so, more importantly, while limiting expansionary or inflationary 
alternatives such as further increases in outlay for the pay, training, and re-
cruitment of Irish or EU nurses. 
Finally, it is instructive to turn to the government’s insistence that the 
referendum, in the words of then minister for Health, Micheál Martin “isn’t 
about migrant workers,” 63 and to reflect upon the children born in Ireland 
to such workers. With these children in mind, it might reasonably be sug-
gested that Martin’s angry refusal to assess how the referendum would affect 
migrant workers speaks to a very different purpose than the preservation of 
“loyalty.” Rather, it speaks to the urge to make the temporary workforce more 
temporary by severing one of the emotional and legal ties—the birth of a citizen 
child—that might make temporary workers feel a “connection” to Ireland.64 
Certainly other members of Martin’s party had trouble envisioning immigrant 
workers as anything other than permanently foreign. When pressed on the 
referendum’s impact on the children of Filipino nurses, Martin’s Fianna Fáil 
colleague and candidate for the European Parliament, Jim McDaid, declared 
that “they are Filipino citizens, protected by Filipino law.”65
If there is a primary economic lesson from American history that does 
apply here, we would suggest that it is not the lesson of protectionism of-
fered by immigration restriction. Rather, it is the evidence offered by African 
American and Native American history that shows how differential citizenship 
provision can contribute to economic inequality by coercing certain groups 
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into undesirable occupations and working conditions,66 and by historical im-
migration policies, notably the Bracero Program, that show how the use of 
temporary workers ineligible for permanent residence or citizenship served 
not to prevent “aliens” from working, but to create and maintain a dual and 
subjugated workforce. As Aristide Zolberg notes, this is a “common solu-
tion” to two conflicting demands on “industrial societies—to maximize the 
labor supply and to protect cultural integrity.” In this scenario, migrants are 
not excluded from the physical borders of the nation but, once admitted are 
“confine[d] strictly to their economic role by reinforcing the barrier against 
citizenship, a legal device which can be translated sociologically as the erection 
of a boundary within the territorial confines of the receiving society to offset 
the consequences of physical entry.”67
Indeed, as migration theorist Robin Cohen has argued, the differentiated 
system of citizenship required by global capitalism has created a world utterly 
different than that faced by the many early twentieth century migrants who 
“threw off their poverty and feudal bondage to enter the American dream as 
equal citizens.”68 The status of today’s unskilled workers from poor countries, in 
contrast, is increasingly that of a “helot” whose origin is an “indelible stigmata, 
determining a set of life chances, access to a particular kind of employment or 
any employment and other indicators of privilege and good fortune.”69
Thus even in partial form, the scenario posed by immigrant “insourcing” 
raises a central global ethical question: whether or not it is acceptable for wealthy 
nations to impose policies and conditions upon the people of poor countries 
that they would not normally impose upon their own citizens.70 Immigration 
may not solve the problem of global inequality, but if, as citizens of nations 
that have benefited from globalization, we are to rely on immigrant labour, we 
must make sure that that labor is not coerced. One of the ways that we can do 
that is to give immigrants full access to the protections of citizenship.
Jus Soli: A “Dead Zone” in American Studies
A comparative analysis of the repeal of unrestricted jus soli in Ireland reveals a 
curious fact about the study of jus soli in the United States: that is, the almost 
complete absence of research in American studies specifically devoted to this 
subject, with the important exception of work by Brook Thomas and, more 
recently, Ngai.71 This absence is set into relief by the mountain of scholarship 
on the Fourteenth Amendment that relates to Plessy v. Ferguson (1896, 163 
U.S. 537) versus the virtually nonexistent literature on U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark 
(1898, 169 U.S. 649), and by the lack even of a keyword entry for jus soli 
within ABC-Clio’s America: History and Life.
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It is perhaps too much to ask the humanities to take on a cheerleading role for 
jus soli. Yet, it is to be expected that, within the hundreds of articles and books 
written each year on virtually every conceivable aspect of immigrant history 
and life, at least some would specifically analyze how the provision of territorial 
birthright citizenship has affected the economic, social, political, and cultural 
life of the native-born children of immigrants and their parents; how jus soli 
has affected relations between immigrant families and their longer-established 
counterparts; how its establishment has influenced immigration law, such as 
the prioritization of family unification; or how the provision of jus soli in the 
United States has affected the legal and political construction of immigration 
and citizenship in other countries. Moreover, the lack of such studies arguably 
has contributed to two problematic results: first, an apparent misunderstanding 
about what it actually entails, and second, the rise of an interpretation of jus 
soli in American political studies that we believe to be pernicious. 
The first can be seen in the noted historian Linda Kerber’s analysis of Nguyen 
v. INS (2001, 533 U.S. 53). In this case, the Supreme Court decided that the 
adult, resident alien, foreign-born son (Tuan Anh Nguyen) of a U.S. citizen 
father (Joseph Boulais) and a Vietnamese mother could be deported from 
the United States for a felony sexual assault conviction.72 As Kerber notes, if 
Nguyen’s mother had been American, or his parents had been married, his 
citizenship would have been “automatically” conferred at birth—but as his 
father failed to meet the requirements for declaring Nguyen’s U.S. citizenship 
before the age of majority, he never obtained it. Kerber argues that the court’s 
decision undermined the Fourteenth Amendment’s birthright citizenship 
clause because it refused to overturn provisions that require American men 
with foreign-born children to meet a higher burden of proof than women 
must to obtain citizenship for their children. 
We would not defend Nguyen’s apparent sanctioning of the differential 
treatment of men and women, or the ensuing denial of “equal protection of 
the laws” identified by Kerber. But we would also emphasize that the case does 
not necessarily infringe upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s provisions for the 
conferring of citizenship. This is because the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
actually protect the “rights of citizenship to the foreign-born descendants of 
native-born citizens”—or any other forms of citizenship based on heredity.73 
That is a matter for legislation, which has protected it, but only in limited 
circumstances, since 1790, and which may yet grant citizenship equally to the 
children of expatriate fathers.74 The source of this confusion is Kerber’s use 
of the term “birthright citizenship,” which does not distinguish between jus 
soli and jus sanguinis, and which thus implies that all forms of citizenship by 
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birth are equal, equally protected, and equally desirable. This is problematic, 
because Nguyen is clearly a case about jus sanguinis, and as such presents 
different analytical questions than jus soli. Moreover, these two categories 
of “birthright citizenship” are radically different, and to defend one or the 
other is to support radically different principles. Indeed, while there might be 
legitimate arguments on behalf of jus sanguinis for the children of emigrants, 
it also could be argued that it is a good thing, from the perspective of equality, 
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not recognize hereditary privilege in 
the granting of citizenship. On this point, we must concur with legal scholar 
Gerald Neuman that “U.S. citizenship isn’t racial,” and suggest that this point 
is not incidental, but fundamental to understanding the case.75
An even graver consequence of the lack of attention to jus soli is the sec-
ond problematic result we have identified: the fact that it has allowed Smith 
and Schuck’s analysis to have attained disproportionate weight. In his highly 
influential Civic Ideals, Smith characterizes jus soli as an “ascriptive anomaly 
in America’s titularly consensual laws of membership” that, like other “inegali-
tarian ascriptive principles,” assigns “people to places in hereditary hierarchi-
cal orders.”76 Smith proposes abandoning this outmoded, “feudal” route to 
citizenship for one based on consent. His argument there follows upon his 
earlier argument, outlined in his collaborative work with Peter Schuck, that 
the Fourteenth Amendment should correctly be interpreted as protecting the 
birthright citizenship of only those persons whose parents met the criterion of 
mutual consent between the individual and the state—and not the children of 
illegal aliens.77 Emphasizing the purported absence of immigration restriction 
before the 1870s, Smith and Schuck argued that the drafters of the Fourteenth 
Amendment could not have envisioned a world in which people obtained 
citizenship due to their parents’ illegal entry into the United States, or they 
would have placed limitations on citizenship obtained in this way. 
Smith and Schuck’s argument for citizenship by consent—one might call it 
jus consensus—has provoked a robust critical response from legal scholars, most 
notably Neuman.78 Neuman convincingly undermines Smith and Schuck’s po-
sition on historical and policy grounds. He shows that, before Reconstruction, 
the United States did not have “open borders”: state and federal law restricted 
the immigration of paupers, the physically infirm, convicts, and, after 1808, 
illegally imported slaves. Nonetheless, the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not seek to exclude from citizenship anyone who descended from 
these “illegal” entrants. Furthermore, Neuman argues, the adoption of Smith 
and Schuck’s interpretation—and the resulting denial of citizenship to the 
children of undocumented aliens—would entail great costs. These “include 
|   590 American Quarterly
the blighting of the children’s lives and the harm to U.S. society and values 
that would result from the creation of a hereditary undocumented caste;” and 
the possible emergence of a calculated 
two-track immigration regime, under which some immigrants would be admitted as law-
ful permanent residents on a naturalization track and others would be induced to reside 
unlawfully and threatened with a sufficient risk of deportation to render them docile and 
to avoid the applicability of the amended citizenship clause.
“In a global environment of overpopulation and Third World underdevelop-
ment,” Neuman concludes, such developments “could transform the United 
States into precisely the sort of society that the Fourteenth Amendment sought 
to prevent.”79 
Without recounting Neuman’s prescient argument in full, we would like to 
make a few additional observations. The first is that Smith’s emphasis on the 
feudal and ascriptive origins of jus soli overlooks its revolutionary adaptation 
within American law: while British law in the eighteenth century recognized 
both jus soli and jus sanguinis for the children and grandchildren of subjects, 
in the United States jus soli was immediately stripped of this tie to heredity 
in favor of a strict territorial requirement in the Naturalization Act of 1790. 
The main purpose of this, as Supreme Court Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft later suggested, was to prevent the descendants of loyalist absconders 
from claiming American citizenship.80 There are certainly repressive aspects at 
work here, as the act deliberately excluded those singled out for proscription 
by the revolutionary authorities—just as Sections 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibited from office holding, and excluded from the calculation 
of “the basis of representation,” citizens who had “engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion.” Nonetheless, the repression entailed within this construction of 
jus soli is of a revolutionary, rather than a feudal, sort and aims to diminish 
hereditary privileges even as it recognizes rights of birth. 
Our second objection to Smith’s reading of jus soli is that, although it ap-
peals to the history of international jurisprudence, it fails properly to recognize 
how citizenship is regulated in national contexts outside of the United States. 
As a radical utopian possibility, the consensus ideal Smith proposes in Civic 
Ideals has some appeal. Nonetheless, the primary citizenship laws of all na-
tions are based not on consent, but birth: on jus soli, jus sanguinis, or—the 
most common case—a combination of the two.81 The only exception is the 
Vatican. With this in mind, it is necessary to revisit the question of what is 
constituted by an “ascriptive inegalitarian principle,” and to ask whether jus 
soli is ascriptive and inegalitarian, or merely ascriptive. As the authors of the 
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1790 Act realized, all birthright entitlements do not have the same implications 
vis-à-vis equality. What makes ascription inegalitarian is not that entitlements 
are granted at birth, but that they are granted unequally: in other words, when 
the circumstances of birth are used to distinguish between those who possess 
rights and those who do not. Moreover, some forms of ascriptive distinction are 
more pernicious than others: distinctions based on pedigree, for example, are 
arguably more harmful than distinctions based on the accidental circumstances 
of birth (for example, time or place). A policy providing that “all children 
born after 2004 have the right to free health care” would discriminate against 
persons born before that date, but it would be less pernicious than a policy 
limiting health care to persons whose parents are literate or who are members 
of a particular racial group. 
It might be objected that jus soli is inegalitarian insofar as it excludes and 
treats differently those born outside a particular national jurisdiction. But this 
problem extends well beyond the question of how citizenship is regulated to 
the question of citizenship per se. As anyone who has tried to get a Vatican 
passport can verify, the conversion to a consensual model of citizenship would 
not solve the problem of exclusion—only the abolition of national citizenship 
would do that. And jus soli does not necessarily have to be limited to persons 
born within a state’s borders. Indeed, as the Irish example demonstrates, this 
is not just a theoretical possibility: Article 2 grants birthright territorial na-
tionality not just to every person born in the Republic, but to “every person 
born in the island of Ireland.” As this wording suggests, this entitlement is 
based on a utopian notion of the Irish nation that, until superseded by Article 
9, derived not from heredity but territory.82 It might also be objected that jus 
soli contributes to the inferior and repressive treatment of naturalized citizens, 
such as the constitutional limitation of presidential election to native-born 
citizens. But this repression does not necessarily derive from jus soli, but 
from the strength or weakness of the laws governing the rights of naturalized 
citizens—the Fourteenth Amendment itself requires the equal treatment of 
“natural” and “naturalized” citizens.83 As a corollary, it should be noted that 
jus soli nations other than the United States have not always prohibited the 
foreign-born from holding high office (such as the first prime minister of 
Canada, Sir John A. MacDonald). As Rainer Bauböck argues in Transnational 
Citizenship, the territorial principle “minimizes the potential incongruities 
between the population over which territorial sovereignty can be rightfully 
exercised and the collective of those formally recognised as citizens.”84 In other 
words, jus soli is a more inclusive principle of democratic self-government.
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Smith’s characterization of jus soli as an ascriptive, inegalitarian principle 
must be re-evaluated both from the practicalities of what is feasible, given 
the constitutional history of the countries under discussion, and the abstract 
normative principles we use to evaluate practical policy. Even if a consensual 
model of citizenship would have the best effects—which given the way that 
states have employed citizenship law, is unlikely—we may have to settle for a 
solution that is second best: in this case a constitutionally protected right to 
full citizenship based on something other than blood or lineage. The removal 
of unrestricted jus soli as a determination of citizenship and the introduction 
of some principle of jus sanguinis in reality removes rights and benefits from 
the children of those most likely to be in the worst off position in society and 
removes from those children’s noncitizen families one of their best chances 
of bettering their own condition by eventually becoming full citizens. Fur-
thermore, as Jules L. Coleman and Sarah K. Harding have noted, assuming 
the legitimacy of borders and then arguing that questions of equality apply 
only to those within those borders begs the question that is at issue in debates 
over immigration or (as here) over access to citizenship.85 Such a begging of 
the question may be occurring both in our argument for the benefits of jus 
soli to migrant workers—documented and undocumented—and in Smith’s 
arguments for consensual citizenship. On the other hand, the other perspec-
tive that Harding and Coleman offer, a cosmopolitan perspective that applies 
considerations of equality to every individual on earth, makes the justification 
of borders or limited communities of citizenship quite problematic in them-
selves.86 As Coleman and Harding note, these restricted entities are justified 
only if they further the project of cosmopolitan equality. If Cohen is right, 
however, about the international division of labor, then the “helots” who 
occupy the lowest rung of the hierarchy of workers more approximate the 
globally worst off than the candidates for Smith’s consensual citizenship. They 
are also the individuals we can most easily help, however imperfectly, through 
a conception of citizenship that affords them a greater real chance of gaining 
an equal share of the world’s wealth and a greater exercise of their rights.
Why Jus Soli Matters
Why, then, should we reinvigorate the study and defense of unrestricted jus 
soli? The first answer is that the need for an ethical response to globalization 
demands it. The movement of capital and persons and the dynamics of interna-
tional labor markets mean that we must take an interest not just in migrations 
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across the American border, but in migrations across all borders—particu-
larly the borders of nations like Ireland with a high degree of economic and 
political interdependence with the United States. In so doing, we must be 
sure to understand how citizenship, like immigration policy, creates borders 
between the global haves and the global have-nots. Just as the trade policies 
and farm subsidies of the European Union are relevant for an understanding 
of the ethical dimensions of U.S. trade policy, so the citizenship regulations 
of European Union states are relevant for the ethical consideration of U.S. 
citizenship regulation. This means stepping “outside the frame” of American 
studies, which treats jus soli as an invisible, inevitable right, and recognizing 
that it is neither inevitable nor without tangible implications. If nothing else, 
more comprehensive research on jus soli’s historical role in American life will 
provide comparative data to international scholars and advocates working 
within less equitable citizenship frameworks. As Jürgen Habermas argues, 
arguments for liberalizing immigration and citizenship regimes worldwide 
can increasingly be made in a developing global public sphere.87
The Irish citizenship referendum suggests that what happens in American 
scholarship does have an impact on what happens in the rest of the world. 
Many of the referendum’s most vociferous critics came from the academic 
legal community. In large part, their arguments pertained to universal or to 
specifically Irish concerns: the danger of hastily changing the Irish Consti-
tution, the undesirability of affording privilege to pedigree, and the risk of 
undermining the Northern Ireland peace process.88 Yet, perhaps surprisingly, 
many of the referendum’s legal critics specifically appealed to American law 
and legal thought, including Aisling Reidy, director of the Irish Council for 
Civil Liberties, and legal scholar Cathryn Costello, who explicitly drew upon 
both U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark and upon Neuman’s writings in her critique of 
the referendum.89 Indeed, at a time when the United States government has 
ceased, in the minds of many international commentators, to be a leader on 
matters of global justice, American jurisprudence provided not just examples 
but inspiration to the referendum’s critics. Citing Ronald Dworkin’s phrase 
that constitutions are documents “of principle” and thus should constitute the 
highest aspirations of the state, barrister and law lecturer Neville Cox made 
this passionate plea for the rejection of the referendum: “I would wish that 
like Eleanor Roosevelt as she worked to create a Human Rights language for 
the world we would be able to say ‘Save us from ourselves and show us a vi-
sion of a world made new.’”90 
In contrast to the passionate criticism of Ireland’s academic lawyers, how-
ever, scholars in the humanities and social sciences contributed little by way 
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of organized resistance to the referendum.91 This relative silence cannot be 
attributed to a generalized lack of political engagement on the part of Irish 
academics; its historians, for example, have taken a leading role in legal and 
political campaigns for heritage preservation. Rather, it seems that scholars in 
the humanities and social sciences did not see the referendum as “their battle.” 
One of the likely reasons for this is that scholars in the humanities and social 
sciences lacked a body of scholarship on jus soli comparable to that available 
to legal scholars, who have also taken internationalism seriously for longer 
than scholars from history, political theory, and the social sciences have.
The second reason that we should pay more attention to jus soli is that 
neither it, nor the notion of permanence in immigration underpinning it, 
is unassailable in the United States. Ireland’s massive turn to temporary mi-
grant labor has an American parallel in the rash of new proposals—from the 
Bush administration, the House, and the Senate—for the large-scale issuing 
of limited-term visas, which come on the heels of a number of temporary 
visa programs for skilled workers in the past decades. Taken in the context 
of guest worker programs in other parts of Europe and in the Middle East, 
what this suggests is that the long era of permanent migration—and the long-
term benefits to migrants that guarantees of permanence can provide—may 
be coming to an end. Revocations of jus soli only hasten this change and 
exacerbate its effects. Smith notwithstanding, such revocations are not made 
for the sake of a more egalitarian, consensual alternative. Rather, as can be 
seen from what has happened in Ireland, Australia, Britain, France, Malta, 
New Zealand, Sweden, and other democratic countries, revocations of jus 
soli no longer take place, as they did following the French Revolution, in the 
context of movements against feudal privilege. Rather, they take place within 
the context of inegalitarian campaigns to discourage permanence, to diminish 
rights, and to institute “caste division.”92
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